Attitudes related to aggression in violent and nonviolent offenders

Chelsea Hagen
Pacific University

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Attitudes related to aggression in violent and nonviolent offenders

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ATTITUDES RELATED TO AGGRESSION IN VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF
SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
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BY
CHELSEA HAGEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
JULY 26, 2013

APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE: Genevieve Arnaut, Psy.D., Ph.D.
Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate attitude differences between violent and nonviolent offenders. A random sample of 136 male prisoners in Oregon completed the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation scale, and the Multiple Stimulus Tolerance for Ambiguity scale to assess authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and tolerance for ambiguity, respectively. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Form C, was also included as a validity measure. Results indicated no significant differences between violent and nonviolent offenders on the three attitude measures. However, violent offenders scored significantly higher than nonviolent offenders on the social-desirability measure, suggesting that the lack of significant findings may reflect a desire to respond in a socially desirable way.

*Keywords: violent, nonviolent, prisoners, authoritarianism, social dominance, tolerance for ambiguity*
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Introduction

In each of the past 10 years, over 1 million violent offenses came to the attention of law enforcement in the United States, resulting in approximately 500,000 arrests and thousands of sentences involving incarceration (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). A nationwide study on all forms of recidivism indicated that 43.3% of offenders released in 2004 recidivated within 3 years (Pew Center on the States, 2011), though in Oregon, where the current study was conducted, only 22.8% of offenders released in 2004 recidivated within 3 years (Pew Center on the States, 2011).

The most recent data on violent recidivism showed that in 1994, the average violent offender served 3 to 4 years in prison but carried a high risk for reoffending upon release (Greenfield, 1995). Of the approximately 60,000 violent offenders released from prison nationwide in 1994, almost 30% were rearrested for another violent offense within 3 years (Langan & Levin, 2002). Furthermore, violent offenders were 30% more likely than were nonviolent offenders to be rearrested for a violent offense within 3 years of release from prison (Langan & Levin, 2002).

As states search for ways to reduce prison populations and maintain public safety, the need to accurately assess, predict, and manage violence risk in offender populations has become more urgent. Mandatory sentencing laws, such as Oregon’s Measure 11, have become a popular way to deter violent crime and prevent violent recidivism among a number of states, but they often contribute to prison overcrowding and fiscal crises (Criminal Justice Commission, 2011). In addition, of factors that have some ability to predict violence risk (e.g., psychopathy and demographic variables), none can fully
explain violent aggression, and relatively few are changeable characteristics (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Harris & Rice, 2006). Thus, other approaches to reducing the risk of violence are needed. For instance, attitudes may contribute to the risk of violence, yet they have often been overshadowed in research and practice by more stable and quantifiable risk factors (e.g., number of past violent offenses; Campbell, French, & Gendreau, 2009). Attitudes can be addressed in treatment, whereas stable risk factors, including personality traits and disorders such as psychopathy, tend to be heritable and persistent despite environmental changes (Harris & Rice, 2006; Yang, Wong, & Coid, 2010).

The first step in investigating the relationship of these attitudes to violent offending is to determine whether and how they differ between individuals who have committed violent offenses and individuals who have not. Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine attitude differences between violent and nonviolent offenders. Specifically, in this study I assessed personal and interpersonal attitudes that have been loosely associated with violence but not yet linked to violent behavior.
Literature Review

In this section, I discuss (a) the current state of violence risk assessment and the role of attitudes within it, (b) a theoretical model linking attitudes to violent behavior, and (c) the place of attitudes of authoritarianism, social dominance, and tolerance for ambiguity within this theoretical model.

Violence Risk Assessment and Attitudes

Risk assessment has evolved substantially over the past 20 years and has been conceptualized as having gone through several generations of change. Campbell et al. (2009) described four generations of risk assessment: (a) clinical judgment alone, (b) a focus on static risk factors, (c) a combination of static and dynamic factors, and (d) individualized evaluation and management of multiple types of risk factors. Although more recent developments in risk assessment are promising, research lags behind the creation of new measures (Campbell et al., 2009). Some researchers have advocated for the use of actuarial second-generation measures alone because they are the most established and well-validated measures for risk assessment (Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1993). However, the focus on static predictive factors in actuarial measures (i.e., demographic, historical, and personality factors) leaves little room for therapeutic intervention, which in turn can lend itself to a self-fulfilling prophesy of ineffective treatment. This approach contributes to a theoretical environment in which rehabilitation appears unproductive and incarceration appears to be a more viable means of preventing violence.
As an example of the focus on static factors, one of the most widely used risk assessment tools, the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG; Harris et al., 1993) is scored using historical factors (e.g., childhood adjustment and past criminal behavior) and a measure of psychopathy. The VRAG has been shown to have good predictive validity, but historical factors cannot be changed and psychopathy has been noted to be resistant to treatment (Harris et al., 1993; Harris & Rice 2006; Yang et al., 2010). Thus, although these static factors may be good predictors of violence, they may not be very helpful from a treatment or risk-management perspective. There is a clear need to consider more changeable risk factors for violence (typically referred to as dynamic factors) in order to assess treatment response, change in risk over time, and the need for therapeutic (or legal) intervention (Douglas & Skeem, 2005).

Recognition of these needs has led to increasing interest and research in the area of dynamic risk factors. Meta-analyses have shown that dynamic risk factors such as antisocial attitudes and interpersonal conflict are as effective as static risk factors in predicting violence (Campbell et al., 2009; Gendreau, Little, & Goggin 1996). Rice et al. (1993) found that, among forensic patients with symptoms of mental illness, procriminal attitudes were strongly correlated with violent recidivism. Further, research has suggested that prison treatment programs can effect significant change in attitudes (Walters, Trgovac, Rychlec, DiFazio, & Olson, 2002). Overall, it appears that measurement of and intervention with certain attitudes could be very valuable in the area of risk assessment and management, but there is little evidence of a consensus in the field regarding which attitudes are most important and how they should be conceptualized. Rather, researchers have called for the exploration of more factors and different conceptualizations in order
to better define the domain of criminogenic attitudes (Campbell et al., 2009; Douglas & Skeem, 2005). In the following sections, I describe the theory and conceptualizations used in the current study.

**Theoretical Connection between Attitudes and Violent Offending**

Although recent research has been focused on violent and nonviolent offender populations, much of the theory behind this research was derived from research on sexual offenders—a subset of violent offenders. In an early study, Scott and Tetreault (1987) tested and supported the hypothesis that male sexual offenders would have the least progressive values toward women when compared with non-sex-related violent offenders and a nonincarcerated control group. The researchers administered the Attitudes Towards Women Scale and found that, of the three groups, sexual offenders had the most conservative views of women and scored significantly lower than the control group on all five subscales. However, the non-sex-related violent offenders also scored significantly lower than did the control group on two of the five scales. The authors speculated that more general conservative value patterns could be associated with imprisonment.

Ward (2000) integrated later findings with Scott and Tetreault’s (1987) speculation on value patterns to establish a viable theory. Researchers have demonstrated that sexual offenders possess moral reasoning abilities that are comparable to the abilities of nonincarcerated controls but that cognitive distortions that delay moral judgment are more prominent in sexual offenders (Van Vugt et al., 2008; Ward, Hudson, Johnson, & Marshall, 1997). Ward (2000) argued that cognitive distortions that permit and perpetuate the use of sexual violence are not independent phenomena but rather are reflections of offenders’ broader beliefs (or theories) about the nature of their victims.
He stressed that, although sexual offenders may be capable of making appropriate moral judgments when prompted (e.g., *It is always wrong to rape a woman*), they often use cognitive distortions (e.g., *She was asking for it because she dressed provocatively*) to defer the use of moral reasoning and act on their underlying beliefs (e.g., *Women should submit to men*). Therefore, high propensity for the use of cognitive distortions (or moral justification) combined with hostile or demeaning attitudes toward victims (i.e., conservative views of women and children) may constitute high risk for sexual offending. Although this research was based on sexual offenders, it is possible that Ward’s (2000) conceptualization could apply to more general conservative values and more general violent offending.

**Authoritarianism and Social Dominance**

Some evidence has suggested that authoritarianism—a trait comprised of conventionality, aggressiveness, and submission to authority—and social dominance—a trait consisting of the desire to dominate other groups—may represent underlying belief structures that could lead to violence if they were used in place of moral reasoning (Jackson & Gaertner, 2010). Further, these attitudes are correlated with political-economic conservatism and may mediate the correlation between conservatism and violent offending (Altemeyer, 2006; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994). The Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 2006), a measure of authoritarianism, and the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto et al., 1994), a measure of social dominance, are well-validated measures that can be used to assess these traits.
There is already some evidence to suggest that both the RWA scale and the SDO scale are linked to cognitive distortions and aggression. For example, McFarland (2005) examined how social dominance would interact with authoritarianism to bolster prowar attitudes. He hypothesized that social dominance and authoritarianism would affect decision-making in different ways but that ultimately both traits would increase the extent to which individuals favored aggressive action. In the week before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, McFarland administered measures of social dominance, authoritarianism, blind patriotism, and perceptions of Iraq to 467 undergraduate psychology students. Both social dominance and authoritarianism were correlated with blind patriotism and support for the war. Only social dominance was correlated with decreased concern for the loss of human life, and only authoritarianism was correlated with increased perception that Iraq was a threat. The author concluded that, although these traits operate through different channels (i.e., social dominance leads to a lack of empathy, whereas authoritarianism magnifies the fear of external threats), both traits increase support for aggressive action and together they can have a considerable effect on views related to war.

Research on morality has helped to explain why McFarland (2005) found similar opinions but different motivations associated with social dominance and authoritarianism. Jackson and Gaertner (2010) hypothesized that social dominance and authoritarianism would each interact differently with moral disengagement mechanisms, four of which were assessed in their research: morally justifying the act, diminishing responsibility, minimizing consequences, and dehumanizing–blaming the victim. The researchers tested their hypothesis with two studies, each with over 700 undergraduates as participants. Both studies included measures of authoritarianism, social dominance, and moral
disengagement, but in one study the researchers measured support for the war in Iraq whereas in the other study the researchers measured support for war in a similar but hypothetical situation. The participants completed measures of social dominance, authoritarianism, moral disengagement, and support of war.

Jackson and Gaertner (2010) found that both social dominance and authoritarianism were positively correlated with the four moral disengagement mechanisms they studied, but authoritarianism had stronger correlations with them than did social dominance. Social dominance was most strongly correlated with dehumanizing—blaming the victim, and authoritarianism was most strongly correlated with moral justification. The researchers concluded that people scoring high on social dominance and authoritarianism made extensive use of moral disengagement mechanisms and that there was some differentiation between the groups in terms of which mechanisms they used most frequently. This differential use of moral disengagement mechanisms may help to explain why those who score high on social dominance endorse different reasons for supporting aggression than do those who score high on authoritarianism, as found by McFarland (2005). In addition, Jackson and Gaertner’s results suggest that there may be a correlation between the two risk factors for violence proposed by Ward (2000): certain underlying beliefs (such as dominance and conservatism) and cognitive distortions (such as moral disengagement).

Given that those who score high on social dominance tended to employ moral disengagement and support aggressive acts more frequently than do those who score low on social dominance, Graham-Kevan (2011) sought to investigate this trait among individuals who commit criminal acts. Graham-Kevan examined social dominance in a
correctional setting to assess whether social dominance was associated with actual interpersonal aggression. The researcher’s hypotheses were that (a) inmates would score higher on social dominance than would individuals who were not in prison, (b) offenders would score higher on social dominance if their crimes involved approach of a victim than if the crimes did not involve approach, and (c) social dominance would correlate negatively with age and positively with lifetime incarceration rates, negative behavior, and resource-focused behavior. The participants were 397 volunteer male inmates at a U.K. prison; each completed a social dominance measure as well as the Direct and Indirect Prisoner Behavior Checklist. All of the hypotheses were supported. The author concluded that social dominance was high among inmates and that this trait may play a significant role in inmate behavior.

Overall, authoritarianism and social dominance have both been associated with favoring aggressive action and moral disengagement (McFarland, 2005; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010). In addition, social dominance has been associated with aggressive and violent behaviors in a forensic sample (Graham-Kevan, 2011). Both authoritarianism and social dominance orientation fit into Ward’s (2000) model in that they represent hostile, disparaging attitudes towards other groups and are associated with cognitive distortions that affect moral reasoning (e.g., moral disengagement mechanisms). Therefore, both of these attitudes were included in the present study because they may provide valuable information about attitude differences between violent and nonviolent offenders.

**Tolerance for Ambiguity**

Tolerance for ambiguity has typically been defined as the willingness to accept and cope with circumstances that are unclear or poorly understood (Arquero & Tejero,
A lack of tolerance for ambiguity has been theoretically linked to both aggression and authoritarianism, but there is little research to support either of these associations (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958b; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). Studies designed to establish direct links between tolerance for ambiguity and traits related to violence (e.g., authoritarianism and aggression) have generally been mixed or inconclusive (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958a, 1958b). These past findings may have resulted from a lack of construct validity (e.g., conceptualizing intolerance for ambiguity as a feature of authoritarianism) and other psychometric weaknesses within the scales. Over the past several decades, researchers have come to recognize authoritarianism and tolerance for ambiguity as distinct constructs, and a recent meta-analysis showed a small but significant positive correlation ($r = .19; p < .001$) between intolerance for ambiguity and authoritarianism (Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). Overall, there is some evidence that the two constructs are related, but distinct.

There are three reasons to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and violence. First, researchers have recently rejected and replaced measures of tolerance for ambiguity that were used in the bulk of past research (e.g., Walk’s Ambiguity Intolerance Scale and Budner’s Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale) due to psychometric problems (Arquero & Tejero, 2009). McLain (1993) developed the 22-item Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (MSTAT) in order to clarify the construct of ambiguity tolerance and address the psychometric deficiencies of prior measures. He ensured that each of the questions addressed either ambiguity in general or one of the three basic features of the theoretical construct of ambiguity: “complexity,
unfamiliarity or insolubility” (McLain, 2009, p. 978). To create the MSTAT-II, McLain (2009) used item analysis to reduce the number of items from 22 to 13 and improve the measure’s reliability.

A second reason to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and violence is that a construct similar to tolerance of ambiguity has been linked to aggression. Researchers have found a negative correlation between aggression and curiosity, (defined by Kashdan et al. [2013] as “the degree to which people tend to seek out new knowledge and experiences, and their willingness to tolerate the novelty and uncertainty of their environment,” p. 13), a construct that shares features with tolerance for ambiguity (Kashdan et al., 2013). Kashdan et al. assessed 64 undergraduates for general curiosity and aggressive inclinations in the context of romantic relationships (aggressive inclinations were assessed as the amount of time subjects would blast noise at their partners after winning the privilege to do so in a button-pressing game). The researchers found a significant negative correlation between curiosity and aggression ($r = -.27, p = .03$). In a follow-up study with 110 undergraduate subjects, the researchers investigated whether curiosity was related to aggression toward individuals who hurt subjects’ feelings (assessed by a self-report questionnaire that required subjects to rate the intensity of hurt feelings and the nature of their response). Again, curiosity was significantly and negatively correlated with aggression. These results are consistent with the idea that low tolerance for ambiguity may be one of many factors that contribute to the risk of violent aggression.

A final reason to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance for ambiguity and violence is that tolerance for ambiguity fits into Ward’s (2000) model; that
is, intolerance for ambiguity is an attitude that would facilitate avoidance of moral reasoning due to the complexity and ambiguity such reasoning inherently involves. In sum, the availability of a new measure for tolerance of ambiguity, the association of a similar construct (curiosity) with aggression, and the fit of tolerance for ambiguity within Ward’s theory warrant the inclusion of tolerance for ambiguity in this study.

**Purpose of the Current Study**

The purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which attitudes related to aggression differ in violent and nonviolent offenders. In past research on violence risk, criminogenic attitudes have been defined and assessed in a number of different ways, but not in the way they were defined and assessed in the present study. Using Ward’s (2000) model and existing research on attitudes and aggression as a guide, I identified three attitudes that may play important roles in violent aggression: authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and tolerance for ambiguity. These attitudes were examined in a group of violent and nonviolent offenders in order to assess whether there would be differences in the extent to which each group endorsed each of these attitudes. Any such differences may be helpful in differentiating violent and nonviolent offenders and ultimately in identifying helpful interventions. In addition, the results add to the growing literature on attitudes and aggression and help to guide future research.
Method

Participants

The initial sample consisted of 149 English-speaking, male inmates at Coffee Creek Correctional Facility (CCCF) who had passed the facility’s reading test (indicating they read at an eighth-grade level or higher) and who were age 18 years or over. As the state prison intake facility, CCCF only houses inmates for the first 3 to 4 weeks of their incarceration. Of the original 149 participants, 10 were dropped from the study due to incomplete or obviously falsified surveys. Data for an additional two participants were dropped due to their scores on the validity measure (1.5 SD above the mean), and one participant withdrew. Data from the remaining 136 participants were included in the study. Half of the sample (68 participants) consisted of violent offenders for their most recent index offense—defined as individuals incarcerated for a person crime—and half the sample (68 participants) consisted of nonviolent offenders—defined as individuals incarcerated for a property crime. Aside from convictions related to the current incarceration, no information regarding previous crimes or incarceration was available.

Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 68 years, with an average age of 35.5 years (SD = 10.67). The sample was predominantly White, and the age and race composition of the sample was similar to that of the ODOC total male population (see Table 1). As shown in Table 2, among violent offenders in the sample, sex offenses (e.g., Rape, Sodomy, Sex Abuse) were the most common offense type, followed by Assault and Robbery. These percentages were not significantly different from the percentages of violent offense type for the ODOC total male population (see Table 2). However, the
sample contained no inmates convicted of Murder and only one individual convicted of Negligent Homicide. The most common offense among nonviolent offenders in the sample was Burglary, followed by Theft and Vehicle Theft. There were no significant differences between the sample percentages and the nonviolent offense type percentages for the ODOC total male population (see Table 2).

Table 1

Race/Ethnicity and Age of ODOC Total Male Population as of July 1, 2013, and Current Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>ODOC Male Inmates (N = 13,347)</th>
<th>Sample (N = 136)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 30</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 45</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 to 60</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and Older</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

*Offense Type for ODOC Total Male Population as of July 1, 2013, and Current Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>ODOC Male Inmates (N = 13,347)</th>
<th>Sample (N = 136)</th>
<th>Z (p value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offenses</td>
<td>9,378 (70.3%)</td>
<td>68 (50%)</td>
<td>0.71 (.477)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>-1.59 (.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>0.67 (.503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>-1.00 (.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0.53 (.596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>2,291 (17.2%)</td>
<td>68 (50%)</td>
<td>1.33 (.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>1.00 (.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.99 (.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Mischief</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1.30 (.194)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measures**

**Authoritarianism.** Authoritarianism was assessed using the most recent form of the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 2006; Appendix A). Altemeyer (1981) designed the RWA scale as a modernized measure of the authoritarian personality construct developed in the 1940s and 1950s. Previous measures, including the California F-scale (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), were met with criticism due to bias and poor psychometric properties. Altemeyer’s original scale was designed to tap into three features of authoritarianism: authoritarian aggression (aggression towards nonconformists), authoritarian submission (obedience to established authority), and conventionalism (adherence to social conventions). The scale has been updated several times, but it retains good psychometric properties. The most recent form contains 22 items (e.g., *The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live; Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs*) rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from -4 (*very strongly disagree*) to +4 (*very strongly agree*). There are no categories or cutoffs for the RWA scale. Possible scores range from 20 to 180, with lower scores indicating less authoritarian attitudes and higher scores indicating more authoritarian attitudes. The RWA scale has been demonstrated to have good validity when compared to measures of similar constructs, including prejudice and attitudes towards violence (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Benjamin, 2006). Studies on internal consistency have yielded alphas from .84 to .94, with most at the high end of that range (Altemeyer, 1996; Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007). Although the scale is intended to be unidimensional, factor analyses have demonstrated possible support for two- and three-factor models (Funke, 2005; Rattazzi et al., 2007). Regardless, the RWA scale has been considered to be the gold standard for the assessment of authoritarianism (Funke, 2005). This scale was used with caution in the present study because it has not been used with correctional populations in past research.
Social Dominance. Social Dominance was assessed using the 16-item version of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Appendix B). The SDO scale was created to measure the desire for between-group discrimination and hierarchy among social groups (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). The items (e.g., *It would be good if groups could be equal; Inferior groups should stay in their place*) are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*very negative*) to 7 (*very positive*). Possible scores range from 16 to 112 with lower scores indicating less social dominance and higher scores indicating more social dominance. There are no cutoffs or categories for the SDO scale. The 16-item version has shown good reliability and validity. In studies with multiple samples taken across several nations, reliability was high ($r = .83$), as were construct validity comparisons with sexism ($r = .51$) and ethnic prejudice ($r = .41$; Pratto et al., 2006). In addition, the SDO has good discriminant validity when compared to the RWA scale (alphas range from .22 to .23) and measures of interpersonal dominance in Americans (Altemeyer, 1996; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2006). This measure has also demonstrated good validity for prisoner populations (Graham-Kevan, 2011). Overall, Graham-Kevan (2011) concluded that the SDO scale is a well-validated measure that is appropriate for use with incarcerated individuals.

Tolerance for Ambiguity. The MSTAT-II was used to assess tolerance for ambiguity (Appendix C). The scale contains 13 items (e.g., *I dislike ambiguous situations; I prefer familiar situations to new ones*) rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Possible scores range from 13 to 65, with lower scores indicating lower tolerance for ambiguity and higher scores indicating higher tolerance for ambiguity. There are no cutoff scores or categories for the MSTAT-II.
II. Factor analysis confirmed that the MSTAT-II could represent a one-dimensional theoretical model, and internal consistency reliability was .83 (McLain, 2009). Construct validity was difficult to assess due to similar measures’ psychometric problems, but correlations with these measures have ranged from .09 (Budner Ambiguity Intolerance) to .41 (MacDonald AT-20 Ambiguity Tolerance; McLain, 2009). Overall, the MSTAT-II has acceptable validity and reliability scores, suggesting it has adequate psychometric properties for general use. The MSTAT-II has not been used with correctional populations in the past so it was interpreted with caution in this study.

**Social Desirability.** The 13-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Form C (MC-C) was used to assess social desirability (Reynolds, 1982; Appendix D). The items (e.g., *I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way; I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake*) are rated True or False. Possible scores range from 0-13, with low scores indicating less socially desirable responding and higher scores indicating more socially desirable responding. There are no cutoff scores or categories for the MC-C. The estimated reliability ($r = .76$) and construct validity ($r = .93$) for the MC-C are high and indicate that the measure is acceptable for general use (Andrews & Meyer, 2003). Additionally, Andrews and Meyer (2003) validated the MC-C with a sample of individuals involved in forensic evaluations. The researchers found the MC-C had a high positive correlation with the MC ($r = .91$) when evaluating these individuals. Further, they found that forensic populations had a significantly higher mean score ($M = 7.61, SD = 3.33$) than did nonforensic populations ($M = 5.37, SD = 3.13$) on the MC-C. Overall, Andrews and Meyer (2003) demonstrated that the MC-C has strong psychometric properties and is appropriate for use as a validity measure with forensic populations.
Procedure

Prior to data collection, the current study was approved by both the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) Research Committee and the Pacific University Institutional Review Board. ODOC staff provided a randomly generated list of names of inmates who met the inclusionary criteria. All inmates who met inclusion criteria were invited to participate. Inmates were sent to a classroom in groups of 15 to 20 by correctional staff. I verbally reviewed the Informed Consent form (Appendix E) with the group and informed the inmates that if they chose to participate they would be able to withdraw from the study at any time prior to handing in the completed surveys. After those who declined to participate left the room (response rate was not recorded), I verbally reviewed the four surveys with the inmates who agreed to participate and answered any questions they had. After signing the Informed Consent form, participants completed identical packets, which consisted of all the measures in the following order: RWA scale, MSTAT-II scale, SDO scale, and MC-C scale. I recorded an identification number on each of these instruments. Each participant handed in his packet and left the room when he was finished.
Results

Independent-samples \( t \) tests were used to evaluate each of the following hypotheses: (a) violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the RWA scale, (b) violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the SDO scale, and (c) violent offenders would score lower than nonviolent offenders on the MSTAT-II scale. In addition, a \( t \) test was used to determine whether there was a significant difference between violent and nonviolent offenders’ scores on the MC-C. The current study did not include a hypothesis regarding the MC-C, but analysis of the measure was included to assess response style. A significant result would imply that one offender group was more motivated than the other group to provide socially desirable responses, which in turn would challenge the validity of the other three analyses.

Before conducting a \( t \) test for the first hypothesis, the data were tested to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated. The Levene’s test for the equality of variance was not significant (\( F = 2.3, p = .14 \)), so equal variances were assumed. The first hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the RWA scale was not supported: Violent offenders (\( M = 90.60, SD = 26.66 \)) on average scored lower, though not significantly lower, than nonviolent offenders (\( M = 92.75, SD = 22.43 \)) on the RWA scale, \( t(134) = .51, p = .61 \). As noted above, there are no categories or descriptive ranges for the RWA scale, but both of the groups in the current study scored in the middle of the possible range (20 to 180). The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from -6.20 to 10.51. The eta-squared (\( \eta^2 = 0.002 \)) effect size index was small and indicated that 0.2% of the variance
in the score on the RWA scale was accounted for by the nature of the offense. Before conducting the t test the data for the second hypothesis, the data were tested to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated. The Levene’s test for the equality of variance was not significant ($F = .15, p = .70$), so equal variances were assumed. The second hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the SDO scale was not supported: Violent offenders ($M = 44.06, SD = 16.90$) on average scored lower, though not significantly lower, than nonviolent offenders ($M = 46.57, SD = 16.54$) on the SDO scale, $t(134) = .88, p = .38$. As noted earlier, there are no categories for scores on the SDO, but both groups scored in the middle of the possible range of scores (16 to 112). The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from -3.16 to 8.19. The eta-squared ($\eta^2 = 0.006$) effect size index was small and indicated that 0.6% of the variance in the score on the SDO scale was accounted for by the nature of the offense.

Before conducting the t test the data for the third hypothesis, the data were tested to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated. The Levene’s test for the equality of variance was significant ($F = 4.22, p = .04$), so equal variances were not assumed, and the t test values were adjusted accordingly. The third hypothesis that violent offenders would score lower than nonviolent offenders on MSTAT-II scale was not supported: Violent offenders ($M = 41.87, SD = 9.29$) on average scored slightly, though not significantly, lower than nonviolent offenders ($M = 42.75, SD = 7.09$) on the MSTAT-II scale, $t(125.24) = .62, p = .54$. As noted above, no categories or cutoff scores exist for the SDO scale, but both means were above the average possible score of 39. The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from -1.92
to 3.69. The eta-squared ($\eta^2 = 0.003$) effect size index was small and indicated that 0.3% of the variance in the score on the MSTAT-II scale was accounted for by the nature of the offense.

Before interpreting the $t$ test for the data for the MC-C social desirability scale, the data were tested to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated. The Levene’s test for the equality of variance was not significant ($F = .07, p = .79$), so equal variances were assumed. The $t$ test was significant, $t(134) = 2.25, p = .026$. Violent offenders ($M = 7.43, SD = 3.38$) on average scored significantly higher than nonviolent offenders ($M = 6.15, SD = 3.30$) on the MC-C scale. As noted above, there are no cutoff scores or categories for the MC-C scale, but both groups means were near the middle of the possible range of scores (0 to 13). The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from .15 to 2.42. The eta-squared ($\eta^2 = 0.036$) effect size index was small and indicated that 3.6% of the variance in the score on the MC-C scale was accounted for by the nature of the offense.
Discussion

Despite previous studies that indicated a connection between aggression and the attitudes investigated in this study—authoritarianism (McFarland, 2005; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010), social dominance (Graham-Kevan 2011; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010), and tolerance for ambiguity (Kashdan et al., 2013; Van Hiel, et al., 2010), the results of the current study indicated no significant differences between violent and nonviolent offenders on any of the attitude measures.

Looking specifically at the first hypothesis, the current results did not support the hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the RWA scale measuring authoritarianism. The difference between these groups was not significant, indicating that there was no difference between violent and nonviolent offenders in terms of authoritarianism. However, it is worth noting that, contrary to the hypothesis, on average nonviolent offenders actually scored slightly (though not significantly) higher than violent offenders on the RWA scale ($M = 92.75$ and 90.60, respectively). There are no official cutoff scores or categories for the RWA scale, but scores of approximately 90 are considered average for adults in the United States (Altemeyer, 2006). Although previous researchers found that authoritarianism was linked to prowar attitudes and moral disengagement (Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; McFarland, 2005), the current results indicate that authoritarianism was not directly associated with the perpetration of violent crimes. Thus, the findings do not contradict prior research, but they fail to extend prior associations between authoritarianism and proviolent attitudes to a correlation between authoritarianism and violent crimes.
The current results also failed to support the second hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the SDO scale measuring social dominance. The findings indicate that violent offenders and nonviolent offenders did not differ significantly on social dominance orientation. The means for the violent and nonviolent offenders indicate that contrary to the hypothesis, on average nonviolent offenders scored slightly (though not significantly) higher than violent offenders on the SDO scale ($M = 46.57$ and $44.06$, respectively). There are no cutoff scores or categories for the SDO scale, but the means were somewhat lower than those obtained in Graham-Kevan’s (2011) sample of violent and nonviolent offenders ($M = 52.87$, $SD = 16.24$ and $M = 49.26$, $SD = 15.01$, respectively). These results are surprising given that Graham-Kevan found support for a relationship between social dominance orientation and violent behavior prior to and during incarceration. Cultural differences may have influenced these divergent results, as the previous study was conducted in the United Kingdom whereas the current study was in the United States. Also, Graham-Kevan’s study included a sample size of 397 inmates, which increased the power and thus the sensitivity to small differences relative to the current study’s sample size of 136 inmates.

Finally, the current results did not support the third hypothesis that violent offenders would score significantly lower on the MSTAT-II—a measure of tolerance for ambiguity—than would nonviolent offenders. On average, violent offenders scored slightly (though not significantly) lower than nonviolent offenders ($M = 41.87$ and $42.75$, respectively), which indicates that violent and nonviolent offenders showed comparable levels of tolerance for ambiguity. There are no cutoff scores for the MSTAT-II, but these means were similar to the means of other groups who have taken the MSTAT-II,
including students \((M = 41.6 \ SD = 7.6; \text{McLain, 2009})\) and firefighter-emergency medical technicians \((M = 44.0, \ SD = 7.18; \text{McLain, 2009})\). Despite the use of a psychometrically improved measure, the results were congruent with previous studies that showed no support for a relationship between aggression and tolerance for ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958a; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958b).

Of note, violent offenders scored significantly higher than nonviolent offenders on the MC-C social desirability scale \((M = 7.43 \text{ and } 6.15, \text{ respectively})\). The violent offenders’ mean was closer than was the nonviolent offenders’ mean to previously established forensic norms for the MC-C \((M = 7.61, \ SD = 3.32; \text{Andrews & Meyer, 2003})\). This group difference on the MC-C indicates that violent offenders may have been more motivated than nonviolent offenders to portray themselves in a positive light, which could have lowered their scores on the RWA scale and the SDO and inflated their scores on the MSTAT-II. No standard adjustments are available to correct other attitude measures based on high scores on the MC-C, but the significant difference in validity scores between the two groups does challenge the validity of the results for the other measures.

**Strengths and Limitations**

The present study had several strengths. First, it included a random sample of all male inmates entering the Oregon prison system over the course of several weeks. Second, the study was conducted at an intake facility, meaning that many variables, including time spent in prison during this incarceration, facility differences, and security level, were controlled. Third, the study included a relatively large sample size of 136 participants. Fourth, I included a validity scale to ensure that participants who attempted
to portray themselves in an unrealistically positive light were dropped from the study. In addition, the validity scale informed the interpretation of the other scales. Fifth, this was the first study to include the RWA scale, the SDO scale, and the MSTAT-II together, as well as the first to use the RWA scale and the MSTAT-II on a prison population.

The limitations of the present study are numerous. First, all of the measures used were shortened versions of longer measures. Although each shortened version had ample empirical support, shorter measures have less reliability and can decrease statistical differences between groups as compared to longer versions. Second, due to the limited number of inmates who met the criteria for inclusion and agreed to participate, the sample size was substantially lower than was originally planned, which limited the power of the statistical analysis. Third, there was no systematic way to adjust the attitude measure scores based on the validity measure scores. As a result, the attitude measures were treated as equally valid regardless of whether participants attempted to answer the survey in a socially desirable manner (although participants who scored 1.5 standard deviations above the mean on the MC-C were dropped from the study).

A fourth limitation was that no data were collected regarding past contact with the criminal justice system, which means variables such as prior offenses and previous time served in prison were not controlled. Therefore, individuals in the nonviolent group may have in fact had prior charges or convictions for violent offenses. In addition, total time spent in prison over each participant’s lifetime may have differed between the groups; I was unable to test this possibility because I had no data on lifetime incarceration. Finally, the response rate of the participants was not recorded in the current study, and a
number of inmates refused to participate. The inmates who did participate may have differed in some important way from those who refused participation.

**Directions for Future Research**

Future research in this area should feature improved psychometric quality and control for additional variables. The sample size in the current study may have been too small to detect significant differences, so the use of a larger sample size may be helpful. Also, a systematic correction for response style may assist future researchers in controlling a significant source of bias. It may also be useful for future researchers to include variables associated with lifetime contact with the criminal justice system or to verify that participants with nonviolent offenses did not have violent past offenses. Analyzing offender group differences based on past convictions and total time served in prison may provide evidence of confounding variables that could be examined. Also, further analysis could be conducted to investigate the extent to which the attitudes of interest are associated with age, race, gender, and other demographic variables.

In addition, it may be useful for future researchers to address the difference between violent and nonviolent offenders in their performance on social desirability measures. Differences in response style between violent and nonviolent offenders could prove to be an important correlate in differentiating between the two groups as well as a consideration in the interpretation of other psychological measures.

**Implications**

Overall, violent and nonviolent offenders did not differ significantly on the measures of authoritarianism, social dominance, and tolerance for ambiguity administered in this study. Thus, this study offers no support for the use of Ward’s
(2000) model as a model for violent offending. However, the results do add to the literature on the connection between attitudes and violent offending and may encourage future researchers to explore different attitudes as possible predictors of violence. In addition, this study did yield significant results on the social desirability measure, which warrants further research into response style differences between violent and nonviolent offenders.
References


Appendix A

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 2006)

NOTE: Response scale: +4, +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4. Positive and negative signs represent agreement and disagreement, respectively, and numbers denote extent from slightly (1) to very strongly (4).

1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance.
2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
5. It is better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds.
6. Atheist and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silences the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.
9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.
12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.
13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.
14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.
15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are suppose to be done.”
16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.

17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants it to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.

20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family values.”

22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.
Appendix B

Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994)

NOTE: Response scale is from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). Items 9-16 are reverse scored.

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No group should dominate in society.
Appendix C

Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale-II (McLain, 2008)

NOTE: Response scale is from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items marked with an “R” are reverse scored.

____ 1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well. R
____ 2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different perspectives. R
____ 3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous. R
____ 4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. R
____ 5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little threatening. R
____ 6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand. R
____ 7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.
____ 8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous.
____ 9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one “best” solution. R
____ 10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity.
____ 11. I dislike ambiguous situations. R
____ 12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain. R
____ 13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity.
Appendix D

Marlow-Crown Social Desirability Scale, Form C (Reynolds, 1982)

Response scale: Respondents mark each statement True or False.

____ 1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
____ 2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
____ 3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.
____ 4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right.
____ 5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
____ 6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
____ 7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
____ 8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
____ 9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
____ 10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
____ 11. There have times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
____ 12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
____ 13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
# Informed Consent

## 1. Study Title

Attitudes Related to Aggression in Violent and Nonviolent Offenders

## 2. Study Personnel

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chelsea Hagen, BA</td>
<td>Principal Investigator</td>
<td>Pacific University</td>
<td>School of Professional Psychology</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hage6676@pacificu.edu">hage6676@pacificu.edu</a></td>
<td>(503) 352-2900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genevieve Arnaut, PsyD, PhD</td>
<td>Faculty Advisor</td>
<td>Pacific University</td>
<td>School of Professional Psychology</td>
<td><a href="mailto:arnaut@pacificu.edu">arnaut@pacificu.edu</a></td>
<td>(503) 352-2900</td>
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## 3. Study Invitation, Purpose, Location, and Dates

You are invited to participate in a research study about different types of attitudes among prisoners. The project will be completed by August 2013. The study will take place at Coffee Creek Correctional Facility. The results of this study will be used to learn about attitude differences among prisoners who are incarcerated for different types of offenses.

## 4. Participant Characteristics and Exclusionary Criteria

You can participate in this study if you are male, at least 18 years old, and can speak and read English at the eight-grade level. You cannot participate if you are younger than 18 years old or cannot speak or read at the eighth-grade level.

## 5. Study Materials and Procedures

You will be asked to fill out four surveys. Each survey will ask you questions about different attitudes or opinions. About 250 other inmates like you will participate in the study. Participation will take about 45-60 minutes. It will not cost you anything to be a part of the study. If you do not wish to participate in the study, correctional
staff will escort you back to your housing unit. A researcher will be present at all times to answer any questions you might have.

6. Risks, Risk Reduction Steps, and Clinical Alternatives

a. Anticipated Risks and Strategies to Minimize or Avoid Risk
This study poses minimal risk to participants. There are no foreseen physical, economic, or legal risks to participants. Social and emotional risks are minimal and may include discomfort at considering personal prejudices and minor character flaws. If you begin to feel this way, you can talk to a counselor at Behavioral Health Services or a staff member you trust.

b. Unknown Risks
It is possible that participation in this study may expose you to currently unforeseeable risks.

c. Advantageous Clinical Alternatives
This study does not involve experimental clinical investigation(s).

7. Adverse Event Handling and Reporting Plan
In the event that you become sick, injured, distressed, or otherwise uncomfortable as a result of your involvement in the research study, you may stop your participation immediately. If such an event occurs, promptly notify the principal investigator or the Pacific University Institutional Review Board. If your distress does not go away before you leave the study location, we will recommend that you contact Behavioral Health Services to talk to someone about your concerns.

If the investigator(s) become aware of an adverse event, the IRB office will be notified by the next normal business day for minor events (reports of discomfort as a result of participation) and within 24 hours for major events (reports of extreme distress as a result of participation).

If you experience or are directly affected by an adverse event, you will be given the opportunity to withdraw any data collected from you during the study up until after you have submitted your responses to the survey.

8. Direct Benefits and/or Payment to Participants

a. Benefit(s)
There is no direct benefit to you as a study participant. Participation in this study will in no way influence parole decisions, or inmate standing or benefits.

b. Payment(s) or Reward(s)
Participants will not be paid for their participation.

9. Promise of Privacy
The results of this study will be confidential. A private number, not your name or State Identification Number (SID) number, will identify the answers to your survey, so that no one can match your name or SID number with your answers except for the investigators. Your SID number and name, which we need so we can keep track of who takes the survey, will be kept on a separate piece of paper in a locked file cabinet inside a locked office. Your name and study ID number will also be kept on an electronic list, which will be kept on a password-protected computer that only the investigators have access to. The lists with your name, SID number, and study ID
number will be destroyed once the data has been analyzed and the study is complete. All the surveys will be carried in and out of ODOC in a locked briefcase that nobody but the principal investigator can open. While you are taking the survey, all rules and regulations of ODOC still count. For example, if you write on the surveys or tell the researcher that you or someone else was physically harmed the researcher will have to tell a staff member. The researcher will also have to notify the IRB at Pacific University within 24 hours.

10. Voluntary Nature of the Study
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with Pacific University or ODOC. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without prejudice or negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw after beginning the study we will not use your answers on the surveys you already completed. However, you will not be able to withdraw once you have completed all the measures and your materials have been collected. We will keep all surveys for our records in a locked cabinet for 5 years. If significant new findings develop (or are discovered) during the course of this research that could impact your decision to continue participation, such findings will be shared with you and you will be given the opportunity to withdraw from the study.

11. Contacts and Questions
The investigator(s) will be happy to answer any questions you may have at any time during the course of the study. If you are not satisfied with the answers you receive, please call the Pacific University Institutional Review Board at 503-352-1478 to discuss your questions or concerns further. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, or if you experience a research-related injury of any kind, please contact the investigator(s) and/or the IRB office. All concerns and questions will be kept in confidence.

12. Statement of Consent

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Printed Full Name          Participant

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Study Role                 Study Role
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*This individual must be trained in obtaining informed consent and have authorization from the principal investigator and/or faculty advisor to do.