© 2010, Kristin Thornburg
Issues of persistence through time have been controversial in recent scholarship. A popular new view is four-dimensionalism: the view that time is a dimension much like space. Although it has been motivated in part by advancements in special relativity, four-dimensionalism has primarily emerged as a solution to recent metaphysical dilemmas. In this paper, I will examine three solutions to David Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics. I then find that the four-dimensionalist view of perdurantism solves the problem of temporary intrinsics while managing to avoid the serious problems that the other two views encounter. I agree with Lewis that it is the best view of the three. I will then show that this view in light of problems related to composition, nominalist perdurantism best explains our experience of objects.
Thornburg, Kristin (2010) "The Perdurantist’s Commitments," Res Cogitans: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 4.