© 2011, Santiago Sanchez


Intentional action is usually taken to be something that is paradigmatically under the direct control of our will. Belief-formation, on the other hand, is usually taken to be involuntary and not under our control. I, however, wish to argue that we have the same kind of control over what we beliefs we form as we do under what actions we intend, or more specifically, what intentions we form. In order to argue for this, I give what is sometimes called an “analogy argument” for doxastic voluntarism. I do this by first assuming and spelling out an account of intention-formation according to which action is a reasons-based activity, an activity we engage in by responding to reasons. According to this model of action, the will is the capacity to respond to the reasons we believe we have. I then assume that belief-formation is also a reasons-based activity and thus that it allows for the will to play the same role as it does in intention-formation. I end by spelling out how the way I construct the analogy escapes some of the usual objections analogy arguments and doxastic voluntarism faces.

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