Home > RESCOGITANS > Vol. 3 (2012) > Iss. 1
Article Title
The Inexplicable Neutral Entity: A Critique of Metaphysical Two Aspects Interpretations
Pages
126-134
Rights
© 2012, Shea Musgrave
Publication Date
6-7-2012
Abstract
The goal of this essay is to outline several objections to what are commonly called metaphysical two-aspect interpretations of Immanuel Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism. This essay will be divided into two sections. §1 will argue that any notion we might have of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is completely vacuous. §2 will outline three objections to metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The interpretive objection is that there is little textual basis for the neutral entity presupposed by metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The exclusionary properties objection argues that metaphysical two-aspect interpretations presuppose that the same thing has exclusionary properties. The identity objection argues that Kant does not allow for a sense of identity outside of appearances and thus one cannot identify appearances with things-in-themselves.
Recommended Citation
Musgrave, Shea
(2012)
"The Inexplicable Neutral Entity: A Critique of Metaphysical Two Aspects Interpretations,"
Res Cogitans:
Vol. 3:
Iss.
1, Article 18.
Available at:
http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans/vol3/iss1/18