© 2012, Shea Musgrave
The goal of this essay is to outline several objections to what are commonly called metaphysical two-aspect interpretations of Immanuel Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism. This essay will be divided into two sections. §1 will argue that any notion we might have of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is completely vacuous. §2 will outline three objections to metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The interpretive objection is that there is little textual basis for the neutral entity presupposed by metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The exclusionary properties objection argues that metaphysical two-aspect interpretations presuppose that the same thing has exclusionary properties. The identity objection argues that Kant does not allow for a sense of identity outside of appearances and thus one cannot identify appearances with things-in-themselves.
"The Inexplicable Neutral Entity: A Critique of Metaphysical Two Aspects Interpretations,"
1, Article 18.
Available at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans/vol3/iss1/18