© Sebastian Orlander 2013
This paper is an attempt at framing Virtue Ethics in a manner that it is not derivative of either deontological or utilitarian ethics. The purpose in doing this is to avoid certain pitfalls in the other two approaches, and the argument hinges on a holistic treatment of values in a social community, as well as the role of practical rationality as the means to edify such a system. There follows an examination of John Dancy and John McDowell’s work on this, with a critical perspective on where these clarifications have currency, and where these fall short.
Orlander, Sebastian (2013) "Value Theory for Virtue Ethics: Rational, Objective, and Human Criteria," Res Cogitans: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1083