© Aaron Arinder 2013
Mark Heller, in “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects,” argues for an ontology of objects with four dimensions. He thinks that by arguing for an ontology that incorporates the temporal dimension he is able to deny some distasteful propositions that the proponent of a three-dimensional ontology must choose between to avoid contradicting themselves as they attempt to develop an account of how objects are able to persist, as the same objects, through change. This is a view that I find attractive, but with some reservation. This paper will explain Heller’s fourth-dimensionalism by looking at an argument he brings up against three-dimensionalism. I will reply to his handling of the argument by raising two important areas of clarification that the four-dimensionalist must address. After this, I will bring up a possible solution to the areas needing clarification by suggesting an ontology that includes an essential part alongside temporal parts.
Arinder, Aaron (2013) "Possible Problems with Four-Dimensionalism and a Possible Solution," Res Cogitans: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1070