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Pages

84-92

Rights

© Rachel Rapp 2015

Abstract

There is much debate about the existence of properties and how to consider both tropes and universals. While the antirealist contends that there are no true universal properties, the realist affirms that there are mind-independent universal properties. In this essay I present an argument for the realist approach to the problem of universals based off of the concept of direction of fit. After beginning with a discussion of properties, I discuss antirealist approaches to explaining the problem of universals, arguing that there are inherent problems with antirealism about properties that render it unsatisfactory. It becomes clear that universals must exist, since a mind-to-world direction of fit is necessary to enable the mind to interact with the world.

DOI

http:dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1129

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