© Anson Tullis 2015
By using Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer attempt to show that Sidgwick’s duality of practical reason, whereby an agent has equal reason to act in their own interests or act impartially for the benefit of all, is not actually a duality, rather, reasons for action are solely impartial due to the unreliability of intuitions favoring self-interested behavior. My contention is that the author’s fail to accomplish their goal. To show this, I argue that the authors are inconsistent, that Singer has previously provided an account of impartiality that makes it just as unreliable on the same grounds as self-interested tendencies. By showing that the authors fail to address the actual target of Street’s dilemma, their argument and conclusion are overstated and that Sidgwick’s duality remains unresolved.
Tullis, Anson (2015) "Duality Unresolved and Darwinian Dilemmas," Res Cogitans: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 18. http:dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1135