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Review of “Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind”

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Book Review

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007, 388 pp. Includes a 9-page Introduction and an Index ISBN#978-1-4051-1761-6 \$42.95

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind comprises 20 essays by many of the most respected philosophers in the field, prepared and arranged in an interactive style. The book for the most part provides a sense of active debate, with only a few of the papers seeming to fail to connect. Pairs of essays included in this rich anthology address ten fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, set in three sections, covering respectively the areas of mental content, mental ontology, and consciousness. Point and counterpoint are offered on most issues, and in many cases the authors address each other's arguments explicitly. These papers, all new, and commissioned specifically for the book, serve well the purposes of both situating their arguments within the context of a general "camp," and clarifying a representative position which contrasts with that of the counter-posed essay. Some of the essays do this by explicitly recounting some of the history of the debate to which they contribute, and others by focusing on key components of the issue they address, and considering what a good position in general would have to entail. Many of the papers make additional positive contributions, either by extending the views that they defend into new territory, or by providing new arguments for established positions.

On the question of whether mental content is determined internally within an individual mind, or externally, by social conventions and external objects, Gabriel Segal provides an argument for the former. According to Segal, what happens within the culture within which one fixes one's terms will undoubtedly influence one's concepts, for cultural practices set the extension of the terms one uses. But how individuals understand their mental contents (the roles that their concepts play in their cognitive economies) is idiosyncratic and is determined purely internally. Sarah Sawyer disputes this view, concluding after examining three versions of narrow content that none of the positions will do. According to Sawyer, Segal fails to note the difference between concepts, which are public, and conceptual explications, which may be specific to individuals. She claims that the level of generality that is used in scientific psychology argues for broad rather than narrow concepts. This is the same sort of argument often leveled at semantic holists, not just in this context, but generally; it would be a wonder, they say, if the external world and social practices weren't there to provide us with our system of meanings, that any two people could ever understand each other. This reviewer thinks that we don't understand one another as well as we sometimes think we do, either within the sciences or without. In fact, it is the discovery of just this fact that often leads to further developments and refinements within a discipline (and within human relationships). Sawyer argues further that since the concepts that an individual thinks about do not

depend upon anything particular to the individual, but are multiply realizable in other people, and perhaps elsewhere, they cannot depend upon anything idiosyncratic, but must be externally determined. One might object to Sawyer here that it wouldn't be all that surprising if two individuals with roughly the same hardwiring and perceptual apparatus came independently to the similar ways of conceiving the environment in which they need to function, particularly if one factor led to the other's development. Segal doesn't deny the influence of the social in concept formation; he simply says that each person's version of a given concept will reside within the framework of that person's whole system of meanings, and that based on the individual's particular experiences (and, one could imagine, other things, such as her specific biology and resulting psychology, etc.).

If Sawyer has won her point, though, and externalism is the correct view of mental content, the following question would be whether that view is consistent with individuals having privileged access to their own thoughts. Anthony Brueckner and Michael McKinsey debate this issue, setting the question in the context of a literature surrounding a 1991 argument of McKinsey's. McKinsey's *reductio* argument for the incompatibility of privileged access with externalism is the following: if someone knows a priori that he is thinking a particular proposition, and if that proposition logically implies something external (about objects in the world and/or the community of speakers of which he is a part), the consequence would be that the content of the proposition, something about the external world, could be known a priori. The proper response to this *reductio*, McKinsey believes, is to reject one of the inconsistent claims. For himself, McKinsey rejects the claim to privileged access. Brueckner goes in another direction, questioning the logical claim between knowing one's thoughts and knowing the external facts that provide the content for those thoughts. McKinsey, Brueckner asserts, has failed to prove that a thought's possessing a particular content logically entails anything about the nature of the world. Thus, according to Brueckner, the second claim of the *reductio* argument is false, and so anti-individualism is compatible with privileged access to one's own thoughts.

The content of our thoughts figures in the third set of essays as well, wherein Georges Rey and Ralph Wedgwood address the question of whether intentionality is essentially normative. Georges Rey continues to maintain, as he has for years, that the view that the descriptivity of the physical sciences stands in contrast to the essentially normative character of "folk psychology" should be resisted. He argues first that there is no consensus regarding what the relevant norms of intentionality would be. There is a difference, he says, between logic as a study of rational relations between propositions, and a theory of what the rational inference would be for an intentional agent in a given situation. Even if a set of norms for intentionality could be identified, he continues, there would remain the question of how to apply them. What is more, it is plain that humans reason irrationally all the time, believe the most bizarre things, "want all sorts of things they don't need, have positively alarming views about the good, and regularly disregard it when even minor interests compete." Not only is intentionality often irrational or non-rational, says Rey; many intentional states are not actions at all. And even with respect to actions, although we can give reasons for them, that kind of explanation is no different from the kinds of reasons a doctor might give for a particular diagnosis: a guess based on a pattern of symptoms. Further, Rey points out, empirical psychology seems to argue against psychological normativity. Some individual modules that process perceptual information, such as vision and hearing, and also the fast and automatic older reasoning system of the brain, are structured so that certain illusions and mistakes are inevitable.

The more recently developed system of deliberate, systematic reasoning sometimes, but only sometimes, corrects some of those errors. If normativism were correct, Rey argues, such errors could only be understood against the background of the thinking system that can provide correction, which seems wrong, since the systems are independent (not to mention that the faster, more erroneous system is the older of the two reasoning systems). The fact that we reason irrationally, arationally or non-rationally much of the time doesn't defeat Wedgwood's position, however, for he argues for a dispositionalist version of normativity for concepts and attitudes. And to have a disposition to do something is not necessarily to do that toward which one is disposed. Moreover, we have many irrational dispositions as well, Wedgwood says, and in any case, he is only arguing for the inherent rationality of particular concepts and attitudes, not general rationality. Wedgwood maintains that to have a concept is to possess certain dispositions toward reasoning in particular ways. Concepts, he says are powers to act in certain ways, and powers aren't negatives; they aren't essentially powers to misuse, a claim that Rey questions. According to Wedgwood, the way that we can know that the dispositions that are essential to possessing a particular concept are rational dispositions is that a perfectly rational being would know when you were confused or using the concept incorrectly. If not circular (Who would be a perfectly rational being? One who would use these concepts correctly every time), this seems to be an appeal to the Cartesian and even the Platonic transcendental arguments for perfection: intentionality must be essentially rational with respect to concepts and meaning-deriving attitudes; otherwise, we wouldn't be able to recognize irrationality. The conflict between this intuition and the opposing one will not be resolved soon, one might conclude.

The final pair of essays concerning mental content engages the question of whether there is non-conceptual mental content. These essays diverge somewhat from the point-counterpoint format characteristic of most of the book, by essentially agreeing on the fundamental point, and using their pages instead to define two differing views of what non-conceptual content would be. Jerry Fodor, acerbic and witty as ever, despite the fact that it won't ground a certain kind of epistemology (he says then we just should abandon that kind of epistemology), believes that there probably is a perceptual given. The crux of his distinction is between what he terms 'iconic' and 'discursive' kinds of representing, or representing and representing as. Appealing to empirical psychology, he notes that many layers of processing take place between the first representation of a (say) visual experience and its representation in long-term memory. In the early stages of representation iconic representations are not conceptualized, and so they do not individuate items or include properties whose recognition would require inferences. Available for a short period are memories of visual or auditory experiences that seem to have this iconic character. These are not the concepts that are used in judging, but Fodor can't see why they can't be the grounds for perceptual judgment. Richard Heck doesn't see the relevance of Fodor's claim to the literature about non-conceptual content. He says that the interesting question is whether non-conceptual content could ever play any role in rational processes, and he thinks it can. Responding to philosophers such as Gareth Evans and John McDowell, who maintain that all content is conceptual, Heck argues that perceptual and cognitive states are different, and that perceptual states have non-conceptual content. The difference between these types of content is their structure. The sorts of relations that can obtain in cognitive states, such as beliefs, are partly constitutive of their contents' being conceptual, and these do not obtain among perceptual states. Cognitive maps, for instance, the sort of mental representations that we use to get around in the world, Heck says are non-conceptual, for they lack the syntactic structure requisite for creating a proposition to express them. They include elements about which

one might have beliefs, etc., but the maps are not themselves the sorts of things that can enter into the relationships that beliefs can. Similarly, visual perception is not the sort of thing that can be captured in a unique structured proposition. Thus it is a different kind of content from the conceptualized sort that can be so captured.

The second theme considered in this series of debates is the ontological status of mind. First in this set of essays is a pair that considers the question of the fundamental relationship of mind to the physical world. Louise Antony's contribution argues in favor of a conservative non-reductive materialism, maintaining that psychological phenomena must be capable of an account in terms of non-psychological phenomena. So although she holds that psychological entities and properties populate a distinct ontological realm, she does not believe that the autonomy of psychological categories implies their inexplicability in physical terms. The two components comprising non-reductive materialism are psychological realism and psychological autonomy. Antony argues for psychological realism by listing several features of intellectual experience that want explaining, and then pointing to language of thought as the mechanism that can explain each of them; why thinking tracks with reasoning, how we can think of absent things, the fact that we act on our representations of the world rather than on how the world actually is, and our ability to predict and explain. Key to the argument are representations, defined as mental states with causal powers; which are "somehow coordinated in a law-like way, with the semantic properties." This makes it possible, Antony thinks, to define thinking in terms of symbol manipulation, and to explain the several features of human psychology that she highlights. Antony finds it striking that there is such resistance to the model that she defines, particularly as those who resist it have no alternative to offer. (Paul Churchland must have been disappointed, although probably unsurprised, to read that.) The long tirade that Antony offers against behaviorism following her presentation of the LOTT as the source of psychological realism seems a red herring, until one thinks of the recent resurrection of it by R. Bennett and P. Hacker in *The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*. About behaviorism she is absolutely right—it is a failed hypothesis, and the language of thought is at least an improvement. The other part of non-reductive realism, psychological autonomy, occupies the latter portions of the paper. Antony appeals to the multiple realizability argument to support her supervenience hypothesis, which she argues entails psychological autonomy. Churchland uses his essay to assess the status of what he believes to be a viable alternative to non-reductive materialism, his own eliminative materialism. Churchland begins his survey by noting the apparent epistemological "backsliding" that has occurred in the work of Bennett and Hacker, and in that of David Chalmers. It is a serious mistake, Churchland maintains, to attempt to ground a philosophy of mind on a foundationalist epistemology, to presume that we can produce meaningful observation sentences that are completely pure of relations to any background knowledge or previous experience. Starting from our own experience of our mental phenomena in generating a philosophy of mind is analogous to trying to generate an astronomy or cosmology from our experience of the sky. It is the wrong point of view, if what we want is a picture of what is really going on. Theory neutrality is impossible, Churchland says; everything we experience is framed in terms of everything else we have experienced in our lives, and the theories we have developed from those experiences. Our commonsense framework of folk psychology is no different from our commonsense theory of motion or of astronomy, and is just as subject to revision. In fact, neuroscience is already advancing a reduction of sensations to physical explanations. Churchland outlines a number of experiments whose results show how and why color perceptions are created in their specific qualitative natures. Further, he challenges the language of thought thesis by appealing

to non-linguistic animals that nevertheless seem to function just fine without propositional attitudes. Cognition of nonhuman animals, he argues, is much better explained by his eliminativist program. This picture is much more complex, but the biological machinery as known already can produce all the representational and computational power needed to explain not just sensory perception, but the way in which those perceptions are put together, and the ways in which objects and our own bodies are experienced, without appeal to a separate, ineffable mentality. Even humans, Churchland points out, where linguistic capacity has been named at least since Descartes as the mark of mind, when the language-specialized areas of the brain are damaged, people seem to be intelligent and capable of performing well in other areas. Thus the basic machinery of cognition does not appear to depend upon language. To try to explain everything that the stunningly complex brain and central nervous system do in terms of language is to address a universe of complexity in terms of a single planet's environment.

Since it seems that nearly all (but not all) philosophers believe that minds are in some way dependent upon brains, the focus of many discussions in this area have moved from whether physicalism is true, to how it is true. Frank Jackson and Brian McLaughlin join the debate of whether physicalism should be understood as a priori or as a posteriori. Jackson believes that physicalists had better believe that physicalism is a priori, because if it is a posteriori, the very grounds for accepting physicalism will be undermined. He offers two arguments, one epistemological and one semantic, for his view. The epistemological argument focuses on zombie replicas of us. According to Jackson, a posteriori physicalists see two possibilities: 1) my twin and I are exactly alike except for phenomenal consciousness and 2) my zombie twin and I are exactly alike physically and in lacking phenomenal consciousness. A posteriori physicalists, Jackson says, are forced to admit that they have no way of knowing that they are not themselves zombies, lacking phenomenal consciousness but believing that they have it. The semantic argument is that psychological terms can't mean what we think they do, and we can't know what we're talking about, unless physicalism is determined a priori. There is a necessary function from terms about mentality to what they ascribe, and if one is a physicalist, that something must be physical, or we face making all psychological ascriptions false. Mental properties are functional patterns in physical properties, and they must be found to follow a priori from precisely those properties, if physicalism is to avoid collapsing in on itself, or lapsing into dual attribute territory. Brian McLaughlin, on the other hand, believes that the proper grounds for accepting that the mental is determined by the physical are theoretical simplicity and overall coherence. His essay covers much ground, surveying the areas of agreement and disagreement between a priori and a posteriori physicalists regarding what in general could be expected to follow epistemically from a Grand Conjunction of all the truths of a completed physics. After expressing a few general problems with the broad claim that all physical truths would follow (the "universal entailment theory"), and suitably reducing its claims, he turns to the issue at hand, of whether the Grand Conjunction epistemically implies all phenomenal truths. McLaughlin believes that it does not, although his analysis of the famed knowledge argument returns an inconclusive result on this issue. With respect to the conceivability of zombie replicas of persons, inverted and absent qualia, and the explanatory gap, however, he sides with the a posteriori physicalists (and, on these specific questions, with Cartesian dualists—his difference with the latter is whether the epistemic gap entails an ontological gap). This discussion, although it may seem small and technical, is important in the philosophy of mind, because it seems that we can conceive of the physical without the mental. But if the determination of the mental by the physical were a priori, it would seem that we wouldn't be able to do that, so

the fact that we can looms threateningly over physicalism. If the determination involved is a posteriori, however, we needn't be disturbed that we can conceive mental differences without physical differences.

The last of the ontological questions addressed in the text concerns mental causation. This discussion involves more general questions regarding the nature of causation, and Jaegwon Kim takes these up in making his familiar argument against mental causation, that there is nothing left for the mental to do, if every physical event has a physical cause. Kim starts by making reference to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia's famous letter to Descartes, in which she declares that, given what Descartes has said about bodies, she can't see how a body could be put into motion by something non-physical. The problem remains in the 21st century, with Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism" (the view that all individual events that enter into causal relations are physical events), which results in a type epiphenomenalism, the view that mental features cannot contribute to the objects and events that have them. Kim argues that Jerry Fodor's attempt to rescue mental causation by construing causation as nomological regularity is misguided, and argues further that Fodor's focus on *ceteris paribus* clauses in his account results in his missing the true problems with his approach. Regularity-based causal analyses in general, Kim says, fail to account for the case in which two phenomena are both traceable to a common cause. Moreover, they fail to account for causal situations in which one thing regularly follows another, but the first thing can be traced down to something else, as can the second, and it is at this lower level that the causation actually happens, appearances to the contrary. So, nomological approaches to causation are unacceptable for Kim. The same can be said for the counterfactual approach, which he sees as collapsing into the nomological approach. In either case, there is no assurance that the regularities discovered are causal regularities. A more powerfully intuitive notion of causation in Kim's mind is a generative, or productive, notion. In order to get at the kind of causation that we care about with respect to mentality, human agency, we must accept some such notion as production. But the production can't come from mental states, if mental states are determined by the physical, without walking headlong into overdeterminism (Kim's famed "exclusion argument"). Contrasting with this view, and with Kim's view as stated elsewhere regarding properties appropriate to science ("genuine properties") is Barry Loewer's position that mental properties are genuine properties (in particular, they are properties individuated in terms of nomological relations) and that they can enter into causal relations, or "something near enough." In order to avoid any explanatory gap, Loewer resists the view that mental predicates can be functionalized; that is, they are not metaphysically necessitated by any physical properties or constructs of such properties. The focus of Loewer's argument is Kim's exclusion argument. Since the exclusion argument depends upon a conception of causation as production, and since, Loewer points out, there is no relation of causal production to be found in nature, causation isn't among the fundamental constituents of the universe, but must supervene on some more basic facts. If we want to know what actually produces an event, Loewer says, we must look at a whole constellation of factors (the whole slice off the back light cone of the event, in fact). So, even in the situation that Kim describes (above), where two phenomena rests on others, but track together, such that the first always precedes the second, we can give a meaningful analysis of causation, in terms of counterfactuals. Although this is not the thick kind of causation that Kim says is wanted, Loewer believes that it works well enough for practical purposes, and so counts as causation, or something near enough.

The final constellation of issues addressed in *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*

concerns consciousness. First among the issues addressed is the question of emergentism: is consciousness ontologically emergent from the physical? Martine Nida-Rumelin argues that it is. In a paradoxical remark, she characterizes her view as substance dualism, but then says that “to call the view ‘substance dualist’ is not meant to imply that there are two kinds of stuff involved.” On her view, certain arrangements of matter lead with nomological necessity to the existence of new entities, subjects, which possess qualitatively new properties, namely, conscious ones. The view of substance dualism that she supports, then, is characterized by the claim that the subject of experience is not composed of matter; it is a new and different kind of entity with special ontological status. Subjects are not physical, although they emerge from physical properties, something Nida-Rumelin finds astonishing. Subjects are capable of a kind of causation that physical entities are not, she argues further; specifically, a continuous and simultaneous causation that influences the physiological events in the brain that are the basis of “mental doings.” When subjects come into being, the brain ceases to be a deterministic system, a notion that Nida-Rumelin acknowledges is inconsistent with causal closure of the physical. The reason for believing in this kind of subject causation dissociated from physical causes, she argues, is that we experience our doings as being brought about by ourselves, and there is no powerful empirical evidence for the nonexistence of subject causation. This is the weakest paper in the text, in this reviewer’s estimation, as it blithely runs afoul of a number accepted principles in science and logic. Entities that are posited to do invisible work, and that are accepted on the grounds that experience seems to suggest *prima facie* their existence, together with the fact that there isn’t empirical evidence proving its nonexistence (just what could such evidence conceivably be, one has to wonder), are not to this reader’s mind supportable. David Braddon-Mitchell seems to agree, for he decides, despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that we can identify consciousness’ essential intrinsic features in experience, that the notion must be abandoned. The emergentist move, he declares, looks like a marvelous trick, of pulling the nonphysical out of a fundamentally physical reality. The problem is that the position will inevitably fall into either causally inefficacious supervenience or physicalism. If consciousness is truly distinct from the physical, then there could be other possible worlds nomologically akin to our own, but in which consciousness doesn’t exist. But then we would need an account of why consciousness does exist in our world. If we posit psychophysical laws in the actual world, but absent in other worlds, to do this job, then we have inserted something fundamental into the ontology, with dualism resulting. On the other hand, Braddon-Mitchell says, if we want to avoid the question of other worlds that are physically identically to ours but lack consciousness, then we must say that the physical laws of our world necessarily (analytically) bring about consciousness. In that case, though, consciousness seems to lose its claim to ontological independence. Any way it is tried, Braddon-Mitchell argues, it is impossible, as the emergentist wishes, to conserve both ontological uniqueness for consciousness and respect the primacy of the physical sciences.

In the second pair of papers in this section, Michael Tye and Sydney Shoemaker address the issue of qualia—whether, in addition to representational properties, our experience includes an additional aspect, the so-called “what-it’s-like” element. Tye argues against what he calls the “unrepentant qualia freak” that the phenomenal character of an experience is not a simple, irreducible metaphysical property. Employing the notion of a part-time zombie replica (who only fails to have consciousness at noon on Tuesday), Tye shows that the standard view of qualia regarding phenomenal change, namely, that it is always manifest to its subject, is implausible, unless such change is significant and happens quickly enough. Even then, if the zombie replica of Tye continues

to sip beer and utter remarks and make signs of enjoying the beer as it lapses into unconsciousness, there is a clear question of why it continues to do so. If there were some missing qualia that Tye experiences but the zombie doesn't, then surely some account of them would be available. None seems to be. Additionally, certain experiences that create serious problems for nonrepresentational accounts of qualia (including sense-data theories and adverbial theories) Tye argues are unproblematic for those who identify phenomenal experience with structured representational content. Tye, an externalist about mental content, maintains that representational experiences necessarily involve facts about the external world and the body, which means that phenomenal properties are a certain sort of representational content. A disembodied brain could not be said to have the same experiences as an embodied one, because it would not have the means with which to create the relevant representations (the perspective from which experiences can be represented). Shoemaker agrees with Tye that qualia are representational, and thinks that in some sense the debate isn't over whether qualia exist (no one denies that there is a "what it's like" to experience), but concerns rather what their nature is. Shoemaker seeks to make a distinction between qualia and other features of experience in terms of qualia's specification as internally determined features of experience. Those who hold internalist views of experience determination, he maintains, can also reject the possibility of such things as spectrum inversion, by maintaining the standard representationalist view that colors are objective properties of external things, and as such determine the color content of experiences. The idea that a zombielike experiencer could have a conceptual space in which experiences could be related according to similarities and differences without their having a phenomenal character Shoemaker finds impossible. Employing his staid functionalist view of relations of phenomenal similarity, Shoemaker defines qualia as "the properties of experiences in virtue of which they stand in the relations of qualitative similarity and difference." Note that the version of qualia that Shoemaker argues for is not the version that Tye argues against. There is no simple, irreducible metaphysical property here, but only the causal profiles of concrete things (which can be intrinsic individuating properties, according to Shoemaker, and that is a feature that qualia addicts have sought). While this is an account of qualia that could be accepted by very many physicalists, it does not seem to have the character that the qualia freaks to whom Tye alludes seek. In fact, when it is said and done, Shoemaker's version of qualia entails the same explanatory gap that qualia were introduced to dispel.

The final issue considered in this section is whether consciousness of our mental acts is perceptual consciousness. Jesse Prinz maintains that consciousness of such acts, and indeed all phenomenal consciousness, is unequivocally reducible to perceptual consciousness. Specifically, he argues that all phenomenal consciousness is couched in some sensory modality. The theory that Prinz describes (rather than defends, which he does elsewhere) comprises two hypotheses: first, that phenomenal consciousness concerns the intermediate level of information processing, beyond the first, piecemeal perceptions but not so far as the higher levels of abstraction; and second, that conscious perceptual states are distinguished by attention. In opposition to higher-order thought theories of consciousness, which he says cannot explain the link between consciousness and attention, or the fact that consciousness comes in degrees, or even reportability, without adding ad hoc assumptions, Prinz thinks that his perceptual consciousness theory is both intuitively plausible and supported by empirical psychology. Apparent counterexamples he believes can always be traced in the long run to some perceptual modality. With respect to action in particular, Prinz argues that, instead of experiencing non-perceptual motor commands that cause us to act, the experience of action may be somatosensory anticipation, or (quick, and perhaps unrecognized) imagination of what it feels like

to act. Psychological experiments reveal that the sensation of agency is sensitive to subtle differences in timing, and they provide support for the view that agency is a feeling that can be manipulated. Similarly, empirical data according to Prinz provide strong arguments against enactive theories of consciousness. Prinz argues further that thinking is provided a better account in terms of perceptual consciousness than in terms of the language of thought. Propositional attitudes, he maintains, have an affective phenomenology; that is, it feels different to believe something than to doubt it, or to be certain about it. These differences, which Prinz terms 'epistemic emotions' find further support in the neuroscientific literature, and when propositional attitudes lack such affect (as in entertaining a notion), the attitudes, Prinz claims, they can be identified by that absence. Peacocke, by contrast, thinks we should understand our awareness of our thoughts and deliberations as a kind of act-awareness, which he maintains is a special, non-perceptual kind of awareness, akin to our awareness of our physical postures and actions. Peacocke delineates several distinctive features of action-awareness, which he argues apply equally well to mental actions. They include that one can be aware of doing something without perceiving that one is doing something; that the content of action-awareness is specifically that one is doing something, not simply that something is happening; that the content of action awareness involves the world's seeming to be a certain way; that action awareness is both first-personal and present-tensed, and that it makes available demonstrative ways of thinking of particular actions. These demonstratives center on what specifically one is trying to do, according to Peacocke, whether with respect to physical or mental actions. That his theory of action awareness is correct, Peacocke argues, is supported by the work that it can do in explaining the experience of schizophrenics, and in shedding light on the illusion that has plagued discussions of first-person accounts in the history of philosophy, of a transcendent "I" behind, or beyond, one's acts.

Any one of the questions addressed in this very fine collection could provide the starting point for a research agenda; indeed, any of the individual papers could. There is no question that, although it assumes significant background for its readers, this book could provide the basis for an excellent graduate course in the philosophy of mind. It has provided this reader with a wonderful summary of issues well known, and new possibilities to pursue further. The editors acknowledge the richness of the field, and the impossibility for any anthology to touch on every area that a philosopher of mind might wish to see represented; in light of this inherent limitation, they offer for their own part that if these essays whet readers' appetites for more of the subject, they have served their purpose. They have served their purpose.

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