Porous Protest and Rhetorical Performance: Democratic Transformation at Occupy

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Abstract

What follows considers whether harnessing word (argument) and action (occupation) constitutes a transformative democratic performance. In this, I am not seeking to replace the Aristotelian concept of performance, nor its transformative aspect, but I do ask how appropriate it is to confine mimetic acts of protest to an Aristotelian dialectic. The “efficacy debate” is a central issue for practitioners and scholars of political performance and I shall not question the truth of such claims that to be a performance the event must transform its audience in some way. Rather, I question, as others have, the ability for the performance of protest to effect any kind of political change. My argument is that Occupy’s politics emerge out of its performance of rhetorical devices and strategies that put democracy on display.

The Greeks argued that everything was up for debate and that everything was relative to one’s own situation and determination. As Protagoras apparently
said: “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or ‘how’] they are, and of things that are not, that [or ‘how’] they are not.”\textsuperscript{viii} This Man-Measure statement is best explained in Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus}.\textsuperscript{ix} Protagoras emphasizes how human subjectivity determines the way we understand and construct our world; judgments about qualities and abstractions—pain, for example— are therefore subjective. In the same way, the dispute of “the 99%” that Occupy claimed to represent (their slogan “We are the 99%” references wealth inequality in the Global North and was arrived collectively”), can also be seen as many disputes, determined by the relativity of the participant. Each dispute is relative to each participant who raises them; each dispute also occupies the same stage and none is judged as more significant than any other; arguments are as important as they are to each person who experiences them. Protagoras’ statement forms the foundations of relativism as a mature theory. It is this theoretical positioning that gives the Occupy Movement its porosity.

I use the word “porosity” or “porous” as it is found in material science. Its key to my argument on publics is its aspect of void measurement or what in art could be called its negative space. In material science, objects with a high negative void or negative space are more accommodating and thus more permeable, with high acceptance of flow or fluidity. I use porosity to define the Occupy Movement as a sponge-like ideological and physical construction that is similarly open. Thus, the dispute that Occupy claims to represent can be seen as many disputes: it can be the anger of the pensioner over fuel poverty; or the disillusion of the graduate student over an empty future. The Royal Court’s production of Anders Lustgarden’s play \textit{If You Don’t Let us Dream, We Won’t Let You Sleep}, was a dramaturgical memorialisation of the porosity of the Occupy movement. The play—a distillation of the constitution and ideology of the protest—included: a 1970’s activist; a pensioner who cannot afford her gas bill; a disenfranchised city worker; an out of work graduate; an economics post-graduate; and an angry unemployed youth all gathering to protest on the same platform but for different reasons. Such a model is democratic and porous in form and, I argue, its rhetoric draws from virtue in the tradition of moralists. This poses a methodological problem in that, as Warner describes,\textsuperscript{vi} the way we have been pre-conditioned to understand the presentation and reception of speechifying of, in and with publics, is informed and dependent on the subject’s engagement with that very public.

Occupy was set in motion by a group of people in New York in 2011 who felt neglected when it came to expressing their situation within in the global financial crisis. David Graeber\textsuperscript{vii} records the first email he received on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of August to alert him to something “strange” happening near the big bull sculpture near the New York Stock Exchange. The numbers grew, and less than a month later the protesters moved to Zuccotti Park, a public square within shouting distance of City Hall. Quite quickly, London followed suit and protesters attempted to occupy Paternoster Square outside the City’s Stock Exchange in protest of the
current capitalist regime. They were pushed a few hundred yards left and onto the steps of St Paul’s Cathedral—a wise placement as this insinuated the Church into an argument largely constituted as a moral one. On 26 October 2011, an initial statement—a Manifesto—was collectively agreed upon by the first 500 people involved in the Occupation:

1. The current system is unsustainable. It is undemocratic and unjust. We need alternatives; this is where we work towards them.
2. We are of all ethnicities, backgrounds, genders, generations, sexualities dis/abilities and faiths. We stand together with occupations all over the world.
3. We refuse to pay for the banks’ crisis.
4. We do not accept the cuts as either necessary or inevitable. We demand an end to global tax injustice and our democracy representing corporations instead of the people.
5. We want regulators to be genuinely independent of the industries they regulate.
6. We support the strike on the 30th November and the student action on the 9th November, and actions to defend our health services, welfare, education and employment, and to stop wars and arms dealing.
7. We want structural change towards authentic global equality. The world’s resources must go towards caring for people and the planet, not the military, corporate profits or the rich.
8. The present economic system pollutes land, sea and air, is causing massive loss of natural species and environments, and is accelerating humanity towards irreversible climate change. We call for a positive, sustainable economic system that benefits present and future generations. [added 19 November 2011].
9. We stand in solidarity with the global oppressed and we call for an end to the actions of our government and others in causing this oppression.
10. This is what democracy looks like. Come and join us!viii

Their goal was to share their doubt, fear, outrage and worries on matters of public importance with others. The behaviour and participation of Occupyists offered a provocative form of education and public philosophy. In this context, public philosophy refers to doing philosophy with general audiences in a non-academic setting. The Learning-Tents erected outside of St. Paul’s Cathedral, for example, were offered to everyone as places of self-discovery and revelation—a variegated public space for learning to happen via discourse and assembly.

Their view on education is similar to the Sophists in Plato’s Protagoras. Sophists were originally associated with a rational and critical attitude that was widely unwelcomed by the conservative Greeks of the day, as the implications of their arguments dismantled opinions. Plato records that they developed tax-
onomies of speech acts – assertion, question, answer, and command—that are widely associated with political rhetoric and the art of argumentation. Callias, a Sophist in whose house the dialogue is set, has an anarchic view of politics, in which he advocates that everyone should do according to his nature. “In this view,” as Cohen observed, “education is a haphazard affair in which some learn, others do not, and all at their own pace, in their own style, and at their own discretion.” This role-play is provocative as it emphasises not what is being learned, but the socially democratic nature of collective learning. “All voices will be heard in rational deliberation” and “the force of the better argument” could be borne out such that “unjust social situations could be [rhetorically] corrected.”

In line with Habermas’ theoretical conceptions of ideal speech, “all affected participants [should] be included in deliberation, as it is only through the inclusion of all those who may be affected that all interests are heard.”

PERFORMING CARNIVAL, RHETORIC AND TRANSFORMATION

Occupyists became a moveable feast of pop-up anti-authoritarian clashes that employed irony and play in their convening of tactical, porous flash-mobs. Regional occupations, university occupations and occupations of public libraries facing closure were all repetitive examples of the Movement as performed in this way. In this paradigm, participants seemed to freeze-frame or converge as a living tableau whose liquidity of motion translated, rhetorically, as a response to the current hegemony. I see this as connected to Carnival in form. To me, Carnival describes an ad-hoc, moving parade of provocation, not merely the costumed spectacle that (for example) the Notting Hill Carnival has become. A “carnival,” as Crichlow and Armstrong note, “precipitates political and economic questions, on the one hand with a view to scrutinizing (top-down) state interventions and impositions, and, on the other, with bottom-up or horizontal carnivalesque subversions and general manoeuvres.” The performance aesthetic of protest at Occupy was more contingent on rhetorical carnival and the opening up of porous spaces of knowledge than on bodily performance or, for example, a salsa rhythm. It is deliberately anti-authoritarian and disruptive and easily lent itself to a movement identified as global, anti-corporate and anti-authoritarian. What this exemplifies is an aesthetic of rhetoric that performs (to both its constituents and spectators) as a redemptive and authentic inversion of the capitalist system.

There was an exchangeability of repetition in the movement that Žižek referenced from Hegel, but Marx patently underwrote it. “The social world created by capitalism,” wrote Policante, imbricating his thought with forms and props of performance, “could be compared to a spelled carnival in which dwell not men but masks of men.” As opposed to the human subjects behind the masks of Carnival (as, for example, described by Bakhtin) the subjects behind the Guy
Fawkes Anonymous mask (also seen in Moore and Lloyd’s comic serial *V, for Vendetta*[^viii]) perform on the “economic stage” as “personifications of economic relations.”[^ix] This Mask is one of many props adopted spontaneously and proliferates as a symbol of “self-knowing, carnivalesque, festive citizenship.”[^xx] I think that the use of the mask performing a (direct) representation of an early English plot (or the ideology of a 1980’s comic book) is an example of an aesthetic rhetoric that has become unmoored. As Jones first observed: “The stylised face of the Fawkes mask [at Occupy] resembles the monstrous and bizarre faces of papier mache, carved wood or leather donned by revelers at carnivals and masquerades in early modern Europe … when the world turned upside down, when the rules of society were mocked.”[^xxx] Performance with the mask does not allude to any intention sought by its wearer to leave behind a solution to the Marxist conundrum of capitalism. Rather, it is a precisely appropriate Carnival Masque that punctuates and resitutates the inconsistencies of capitalist subjectivities in the occupied space. Its rhetorical function is to perform “[t]he jaunty tension between is and ought, being and becoming [and it] allows an aesthetic gaze to slip undetected into a political one.”[^xxxi] Between present and future, actuality and possibility, a democratic transformation must take place that overturns some prevailing constraint and installs a different array of forces.

The rhetoric of popular protest is such that the campaign or the occupation performs as the voice of “the people” united—or at least the non-ruling, non-organised, silent majority. This voice has no particular mandate. Its appeal is to fairness and to the emotionally authentic strength of feeling that arises from the public. It is, as Rousseau[^xxii] famously put it, the expression of the general will that can be realised as the participatory form of civic virtue in a “conscience collective.”[^xxiv] Civic virtue, which we can trace back to Aristotle, is a performance of morality and a public and communal enterprise: “It is realised by the active and continual participation of collective members in communal affairs.”[^xxv] This differs starkly from political legitimacy, which is (in neoliberalism) ultimately tied to “stakeholders” with vested interests and the markets propped up by those that govern. (I imply Foucault[^xxvi] here in using the term neoliberalism to reference the post-Fordism discourse on what ways politics, late-capitalism, and culture shifted subjectivities away from the citizen-centred model in favour of the market-centred model.) When politicians express an interest (if they do) in the effects that their decisions have, their response is couched in the rhetoric of “moral sentiment,” which Seligman explains[^xxvii] is externalised as subjectivity and is, therefore, the impetus for the internal corruption of virtue. This, Bryant reminds us, is a learned strategy of “manners, education and cultivation, which enjoins respect for the sensibilities of others”[^xxviii] but is subject to external pressures—or, in the neoliberal paradigm, to the respect and sensibilities of the Market.

It was personal and communal authenticity of feeling that was so clearly visible at Occupy—feelings that were both passionate and part of the social imag-
Chantal Mouffe speaks of this culture of affect as it intersects with politics and construes it as a way for the polis to conceive of hope: “When you introduce this notion of a social imaginary, it implies that you are leaving the rationalist perspective behind. The term ‘passion’ is some kind of place holder for all those things that cannot be reduced to interest or rationality – you know, fantasies, desire, all those things that a rationalist approach is unable to understand in the very construction of human subjectivity and identity.” As if in answer to this, one placard at St. Pauls blared: “This is the 1st time I have felt hopeful in a very long time.” Occupying public sites became an occasion for the socialization of the body politic in a world in which the polis had been eradicated as a body; it provided a space to perform passion and hope. My argument is that this specific blend of rhetoric did two things: 1) it handed moral authority back to the public and, 2) it behaved as redemptive rhetoric, because words imbued with moral authority are the voice of “truth.”

As in the world of theatre, the role played by Occupyst may be viewed as the locus of conflicting energies: alone, each voice had subjective relativity; together, the communal voice had a sophistry. Examples of this were the props of transmission that Occupy employed, such as a device known as the Human Microphone, for example, in which speakers were rather crudely hoisted onto a raised platform in front of protesters who repeated their words in unison as a means of both amplification and ownership. Taking Judith Butler’s oration as a case in point, the reader can deconstruct the call and repeat mechanism as being a method of sophist argumentation, in that first the orator decides for herself what she wants to say and then she delivers that content to other persons who learn the rhetoric themselves as they reiterate it. It is a bit reminiscent of double-voicing that it contains, on some level, an illicit mixing of what Bakhtin termed “mésalliance.” That is to say, it hollows out the mechanism of speech used for political pronouncements in order to fill it either with “truth” or with subversive messages—as in enacted in a Carnival Mas. This repetition of words, could also be seen as iteration, both in a theatrical—as in the Futurists and DaDaists model—and in a dynamic systemic way—as in its functional heuristic form. Functionally, it amplifies sound while activating aural learning, but on a psychosocial level, as with Avant-garde theatre, it forces reflection on the means and the meanings of that cultural production. Here, however, I relate the rhetorical performance of the Human Microphone to mésalliance and, specifically, to the coda of the carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s mésalliance carries. Ideologically, like Carnival, Occupy “unmoors [the] performance and performers from constrained contingency and liberates the body for insurrection without recourse to either misappropriation or expropriation.” Of course, Occupy could behave in no other way.

Yet, if a protest is both situated in the very thing it rails against and its form is consciously open, it is unlikely that it will transform things in a material sense. It will, however, shift the way debates are framed. If I use the Man-Mea-
sure statement, as I have, to describe the relativism of “the 99%,” I must also situate that 99% in the hegemony in which they have been born and raised. That hegemony is, in point of fact, a neoliberal one that champions the individual—one in which everyone is individuated and morally responsive and responsible to themselves. As Margaret Thatcher reminded Britain, by punctuating the ideological truth that there was “no such thing as society,” the interface between the individual and society—sociology’s fundamental tool for describing and analysing the behavioural interface—has become significantly uncoupled by neo-liberalism. So, too, with the constitution of Occupy: “There are no leaders, no spectators, no side-lines, only an entanglement of many players who do their own thing while feeling part of a greater whole.” So, the Occupyist is both situated as neoliberal and also situated as railing against that enforced hegemony. In this way, Occupy “exemplifies the anti-capitalist movement’s awareness and perhaps problematic appropriation/exchange of oppositional culture and tactics.” If a democratic societal transformation needed to be wrought, it was not Occupy that would make it.

To be fair, however, nor did Occupy intend to make it. Looking again at the Occupy manifesto, we see that their ten points begin with the words: “we need”; “we are”; “we refuse”; “we do not”; “we want”; “we support”; “we call for”; and “we stand in.” But there is no: “we will do” or “we will change.” These words, albeit imbued with the collective “we,” are actually very neoliberal; they reflect purchaser demands, individuated desires and customer dissatisfaction. They are also up-ending rhetoric to make their weaker argument the stronger. Their 1% rhetoric was up-ended by the 99% “we of: “We are the 99%.” From the oldest to the youngest participant at Occupy, the only open and sustaining collective that had behaved as a protagonist in their lifetimes was the Market. But the Occupy collective was different; it remained open and sustaining while it rhetorically provoked the protagonist the Market has become. In doing so, it publically performed a new alternative to the collective protagonist. In this, the performance event is purely rhetorical—the showing of an argument—rather than performing change, yet it is still transformative as it transformed the weaker argument into the stronger.

PERFORMING AFFECT, SPACE AND EVENT

Occupy, as a new protagonist, jolted people out of their malaise by jabbing and provoking them to fight for a society that respects itself and draws lines in the sand against what is intolerable. Signs brandished by protesters emphasised this: “Tax the F***ing Rich”—held by a pensioner of advanced years; “I lost my job, and found an Occupation”—next to the tent of a middle-aged female; and “I am here for my future”—written in shocking pink on the small placard of five year-
old. All recorded spectator futility was challenged by a performance of virtuous hedonistic rhetoric that granted spectators a space in which to be optimistic, in the belief that one (or many) might be able to mitigate the existential pointlessness of it all through something. Recall the placard: “This is the 1st time I have felt hopeful in a very long time.” There was hope, but there was anger, too.

Capitalism in the neo-liberal state ingrains a hierarchy in which “want” ideologically supersedes “need” to such a degree as to constitute desire as virtuous (as discussed above with “we want”, “we need”). The false certainty of this formulation was revealed when austerity measures hit so many whose lives were already precarious. The response that followed was anger over being misled (by the banks, by government, etc.) and anger too—especially for the left—over letting it happen. The trinity of precarity, nostalgia and anger creates what Stiegler calls “disaffection”, which, put another way, is “the loss of psychic individuation. “Disaffection leading to withdrawal is the loss of social individuation, which in our hyper-industrial epoch”xxxviii threatens those most who are already disturbed or disrupted. Stiegler speaks of a psychic pain, one that he conceptualises unilaterally as a symbolic misery stemming from late capitalism, which leads irresistibly to spiritual misery. Low and high-level disaffection are the elephant in the room that Occupy’s slogan—“We are the 99%”—references, and in so doing it creates a social space of potentiality through a kind of anti-performance. The potentiality in the rhetoric of this slogan is recognition and with recognition, Fraser explains, it is possible to develop a three-dimensional framing of justice for the demonstrators, as it brings the pillar of cultural affect into play with the pillars of the economic and the political dimensions.xxxix Added to this are the increased stress levels accompanying global austerity. Stress in austerity confuses and frustrates, but ultimately it fuels anger: “Political rhetoric is often about stoking up real rage amongst a certain group in society; mild displeasure, let us recall, does not start a revolution.”xli This rage performs as participation in the argument for a more materialist rhetoric in which the maps of power are redrawn as object and method.

The staging of Occupy is playful in that it was both a spectacle and the intention to seek spectacle. Equally, it was ironic as its intent was to provoke via the anarchy of sabotage and trespass. The very occupation of the space around St. Paul’s in London performed an ironic inversion of the rhetoric of squatting, immediately following the Parliamentary decision to curtail this historic right. Squatting, in Britain, is historically tied to land tenure disputes first debated in the early peasant revolts pre-17th century, which came to urban areas in the 19th century. It was illegal to trespass on a very few (largely military) sites, but elsewhere and until 2012, squatting was not a crime as it did not involve the state, rather it was a civil matter; in law it was a tort not a crime. In the summer of 2011, Occupystes bedded down in a brazen, riotous colourful performance of a right (squatting) that they both had and then suddenly did not have. Their very
presence enacted a rhetorical conversation on the intolerance the government had of their citizen’s rights to assemble and made visible their discontent in doing so.

Three months into the Occupation, the Conservative Government enacted legislation that made squatting in residential buildings a crime punishable by law. Its passage through the House of Commons happened when defences were down and after two years of a slow drip-feed of conservative anti-squatting publicity siphoned out via the free national papers. The change in the law removed from its people an ancient rite of individual freedom. Since this ruling, squatting in commercial dwellings has also come under scrutiny, largely due to the occupation of public buildings and squares that began with St. Paul’s. The excuse for this scrutiny by hard-liners such as the author of the bill—Mr. Weatherly MP for Hove & Portslade—is the insurance risk that the occupation of a public or commercial property would entail. Risk Assessment Strategy is neoliberalism’s way of administrating Governance—whose dilemma is one of monetary and marketable risk: the risk that an insurance company will not pay out if property is damaged by the public’s presence; the risk that a member of the public (albeit protesting) may get injured and have just cause to sue; the risk that egress is blocked, which limits footfall therefore impinging market trade, etc. It is formatively tragic that the acts of Occupyst in St. Paul’s were unintentionally prescient: in their desire to make their weaker voice heard, Occupation became preoccupation and they failed to see what effect it was having on their theatre craft in the longer term.

Participation in Occupy as a movement invited what Endres and Senda-Cook term “place as rhetoric” because the places of performance—of Occupation—their selves were “rhetorical tactics in movements towards social change.” Further, these authors claim Occupyst incorporated the very rhetorical use of place and space in performance protest as part of their epistemological language. Countering the claim that rhetoricians have yet to examine the aspect of place and space in social movement performances, Endres and Senda—Cook wrote about place as a performer. With Occupy, places of occupation, constituent and spectating bodies—and words exchanged—all interact to create a new language of protest.

Following Endres and Senda-Cook, I argue that the space of occupation, the bodies that occupy and the words and slogans deployed together form a rhetorical challenge to the neoliberal condition. This new rhetoric of protest forms and communicates as an Event at the right time, which is a classical sophistic component of rhetoric. To clarify, when I use the word “event” I mean both a performative event and Event in the Badiouian sense. Badiou’s “Event” names the ruptures in history and he is committed to philosophising on the subject that emerges out of these ruptures. Particularly in terms of the encounter and its subjective truth, I am compelled by the general rule that is the foundation of Badiouian Event theory,
that “truth has its origin in an event. Badiou subjectivises truth and situates an Event (with a capital “E”) as something that triggers the/a truth Event.

Something must happen, in order for there to be something new. Even in our personal lives, “there must be an encounter, there must be something that cannot be calculated, predicted or managed, there must be a break based only on chance.”\textsuperscript{xlii} This theory “helps us think about the ways in which places and ‘truths’, as well as the people in them, are always in the process of becoming,”\textsuperscript{xliii} and I use this to buttress the porosity of Occupy as a rhetorical event that is always and already in the process of becoming, which is—in and of itself—transformational. The Occupyist feels compelled to perform an occupation—the squatting of a building, etc.—as an intervention because their dilemma is one of morality over their ethical subject breaking with the socialised reality of late capitalism and, as Douzinas reminds us, “[e]very time ethical subjectivity breaks with social reality, resistance and rebellion return.”\textsuperscript{xliv} As Mark Fisher\textsuperscript{xlv} terms it, “Capitalist Realisms” are interpolated and resisted by the individual and by the collective. Thus the rhetorical performances I have been referring to were affective to both the individual and the group. I concur with Boon and Head, that in order to break the cycle of domination in advanced capitalism “a new metaphysical and epistemological language is needed – a language that does away both with Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms as well as Hegel’s notion of Absolute Spirit.”\textsuperscript{xlv} As with Endres and Selma-Cook’s argument, we are thus called to think anew about how Occupy performs its rhetoric in such a way that interpolation and resistance are performed as process. This, again, is what I see as both democratic and transformational in Occupy.

CONCLUSION

Occupy provided an open space in which the affected neoliberal subject paused, collected itself and spoke: “We are the 99% and we have moral authority.” Its form performed a resistance to neoliberalism—sometimes in Guy Fawkes Masks and sometimes learning in a tent. Yet, it is important to reference the neoliberal containment in which the protest sat: Acts of disobedient squatting, but for whom? Their protest was of an exclusion that their camps, nonetheless, relied upon. Shared anger at social inequality for what purpose and for whose benefit?

In purging their anger the individual Occupyist enacted a neoliberalism itself, which is to say that it needs to be for all who inhabit it, but in this paradigm the subject is centred and self-sufficient. Performance of protest, but for whom? Surely repeated performances of Occupy-protest, in and of itself, risks becoming hegemonic or what Douzinas has called “ghostly normative” in that everyone, now, has the right to “the Event.”
The top-down, hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism leads to the inevitable manipulation between hegemony, discourse and performance. In a world where everything is for sale, their performances were actively being recorded for posterity and were being preserved—marketized, repackaged and sold—before the camps were dismantled in collections (Museum of London\textsuperscript{xlvii}), via oral history projects (Occupy Oral History\textsuperscript{xlvi}), in the memorialisation of their sites (Occupy London Tours\textsuperscript{xliv}), in works of art (Occupy Art\textsuperscript{i}), and dramaturgy such as \textit{If You Don’t Let Us Dream, We Won’t Let You Sleep}.\textsuperscript{li}

This dramatization of Occupy is a particularly salient example of such provocation with which to conclude. Collaboratively devised, it premiered at the Royal Court’s Jerwood Space in late February of 2013 to good reviews, yet one has to question the utility of an anti-capitalist play that was offered as a limited run performance at £35 a ticket (or perhaps this audience demographic was its target?). What this reveals is the inability of Occupy to ever be in control of its reception and its intent that it was never concerned with doing so. It also emphasises the ambiguities between neoliberal hegemony, rhetorical discourse and Event. Clearly, the ideology and aesthetic of Occupy, sets personalised and public performances of politics at a volatile juncture. The movement and its concomitant acts of occupation behave as a vector: the point of application of a force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction. The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It was an idea performed as an act, albeit a nomadic disruptive one, that indicated and perpetuated motion from others. Occupy was and is a communal nomadic protagonist for change occupying a stage in the public realm.\textsuperscript{lii} The promise of the movement’s rhetoric continues to fill spaces that otherwise seem un-fillable. It conveyed to its audience a conception of philosophy that was an inherent form of public discourse both in terms of its group practice and its group performance product. This is what was ultimately at stake for the Occupists: this concept of coming together, not the performance of it necessarily, but the idea that it needed to be.

NOTES

i See, e.g.: Baz Kershaw, \textit{The Radical in Performance: Between Brecht and Baudrillard} (London: Routledge, 1999)


iii DK 0B1: There is little agreement as to the accuracy assumed in reports that Protagoras taught these techniques in one of his lost writings (Diogenes Laërtius,
Lives of Eminent Philosophers. (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1959) where I use these, I refer to them with their Diels-Kranz (‘DK’) numbers.


vii Graeber, 35.


xiii Boon and Head, 81.


Ibid.


Selligman, 211.


Video of the oration is here http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JVpoOdzlAKQ (Accessed: 09 October 2014 and a composite transcript is available here: at http://occupywriters.com/works/by-judith-butler


Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems with Dostoevsky’s poetics (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1984) and Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech genres and other late essays (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).


Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party’s Conference, 09 October 1987.


xliii  Endres and Senda-Cook, 259.


xlvi  Boon and Head, 80.


li  Occupy Art, http://www.occupyartists.org


lii  Cohen, 7.