Skip to main content
Article

Hume and Our Treatment of Animals

1 June 2004

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the bias in favor of the interests of the members of some species of non- human animals and against the interests of the members of other species of non-human animals. This view, which I call modified speciesism, is perhaps related to Singer’s speciesism, but neither entails nor is entailed by it. The argument takes the following form: given that exploited animals are morally equivalent to non-exploited animals and given that non-exploited animals are morally entitled to the way that we treat them, exploited animals are entitled to such treatment as well. I will give a descriptive account of how modified speciesism is prevalent in our world today which serves as at least a partial defense of the first premise. I will then give a Humean defense of the second premise based on the notion that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering on animals.


Files

File nameDate UploadedVisibilityFile size
Main File
18 Mar 2020
Public
96.9 kB